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Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of              
Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values
were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted f rom
value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-
less metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper i s
to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude
concerning values. It is argued that Carnap’s non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a
deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between his conflicting inclinations
towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism
became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and
American pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and
theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s
pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well are compatible with a logical and empiricist
scientific philosophy.
0 .         Introduction . A major point on the agenda of history of philosophy of science is to u n -                                
derstand how the European and the American version of logical empiricism were related. Eu -
ropean logical empiricism is said to be not "intellectually continuous" with its American
sucessor. According to Giere
"[T]he cause of this discontinuity was clearly not primarily intellectual. It was the
forcible dislocation of many of the major participants from the culture of German-
speaking Europe during the interwar years to the English-speaking world of North
America beginning around 1933. It is with this fact that any future history of logical
empiricism in North America must begin." (Giere 1996, 336)
Others blame WWII, the Cold war, or McCarthyism to be responsible for the transformation
of European logical empiricism, conceived as a "progressive" and "enlightenment-oriented"
2scientific philosophy, into the „neutral“ philosophy of science known as the "received view".
In this paper I’ll argue that "external factors" do not suffice to explain the above-mentioned
transformation. There was indeed a "discontinuity" in the evolution of logical empiricism,
but it took place already in Europe before the logical empiricists emigrated to the New world.           
This European discontinuity affected the development of logical empiricism in America and
paved the road to the "neutral" philosophy of science as which logical empiricism ended i n
the seventies of the last century.
The first main thesis of this paper is that the European discontinuity was caused by an
inherent tension between two opposing background factors that determined much of German-
speaking European philosophy in the early decades of the 20 th century, namely the an -
tagonism between Neokantian currents of "scientific" philosophy" and irrationalist Lebens-
philosophie. Carnap put forward two different proposals to solve this tension:      
(1) The first proposal was the Aufbau’s "comprehensive scientific philosophy" (CSP). Ac-
cording to it the constitution theory of the Aufbau was the core of scientific philosophy.
Science, philosophy, and progressive movements in education, politics and the arts
were to collaborate to bring about a just and enligthened socialist society (cf. Aufbau,
Introduction, Manifesto). Values were considered as philosophically respectable
entities that any good constitution system had to comprise.
( 2 ) The second proposal was a more "restrictive scientific philosophy" (RSP) f i r s t
outlined Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935). According to (RSP), philosophy was
the syntactical theory of the language of science.  Consequently,  (RSP) had not po l i t i -
cal or societal commitments whatsoever.  In Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science
(Carnap 1938) (RSP) was even denied to be philosophy at all.
The shift from (CSP) to (RSP) began around 1930 and amounted  to a radical reconception of
logical empiricism. The politically engaged version of logical empiricism was theoretically                     
given up by the replacement of (CSP) by (RSP). This change, I hasten to add, did not mean
that Carnap’s political and societal engagement vanished around 1930. It lived on at an
emotional level, so to speak, but it was no longer backed by theoretical considerations. The
theoretical realm of scientific philosophy and the practical realm of social and political
commitment became strictly separated. This separation of the theoretical and the practical
paved the road to the transformation of logical empiricism into the neutral philosophy of
science that became known as the "received view".  
The most visible symptom of the substitution of (CSP) by (RSP) was a strict ant i -cognit i -
vist stance of the latter. But anti-cognitivism was only the tip of the iceberg of a more
3profound difference between the two currents, as became evident when European logical
empiricists and American pragmatists came into closer contact from the thirties onwards.
While the (RSP)-version of logical empiricism endorsed a Cartesian separation between the
practical and the theoretical, American pragmatists were opposed to any kind of Cartesian
dichotomies; in particular, they did not draw a neat line between facts and values.  
The second main thesis of this paper contends that the difference between European logical
empiricism and its American successor was prefigured by the difference between (CSP) and
(RSP): (RSP) laid the theoretical foundations for what was to become "philosophy of
science" in the American sense.  The "transformation" that European logical empiricism
underwent should therefore not solely be explained by external causes such as the forcible
emigration or the cold war etc. Rather, there were internal reasons as well that explain why
the logical empiricists undertook their journey to the "icy slopes of logic" (cf. Neurath
1929, 339) and lost contact with the lowlands of science and common sense.
As will be shown in the sequel, these internal reasons are particularly important to
understand why the sustained efforts of the American pragmatists failed to forge a synthesis
between the two currents.    
1. Values in the Aufbau. To set the stage, recall that the world of the Aufbau was a f o u r -                                   
layered world consisting of the four layers of autopsychical, physical, heteropsychical, and
cultural objects (cf. Aufbau, Summary, pp. 241/242). Among the cultural objects we find
values (§ 152). Although they belonged to the fourth constitutional level of the system the i r
constitution was based on items belonging to the lowest level of the constitutional system, to
wit, elementary experiences of a special kind:  
"The construction of values from certain experiences, namely Werterlebnisse, i s
in many ways analogous to the construction of physical things from "perceptual
experiences" ... For the construction of ethical values, for example, we must
consider (among others) experiences of conscience, experiences of duty or of
responsibility, etc. For aesthetic values, we take into account experiences of
(aestetic) pleasure or other attitudes in the appreciation of art, experiences of
artistic creation, etc. The particular nature of the value experiences of the
different value types is investigated by the phenomenology of values... " (Aufbau,
§ 152).
When Carnap wrote the Aufbau in the early 20s he was strongly influenced by Southwest ne -
okantianism, in particular Rickert. Indeed, there are important similarities between
Rickert’s System der Philosophie (Rickert 1921) and the Aufbau (cf. Mormann 2006). The
essential point for the following is that for Carnap (then following Rickert) values did belong    
to the ken of constitution. Values could be constituted in the constitutional system, and it was
4essential for the constitution system that this was the case. Indeed, Carnap was at pains to
point out that values could be constituted in all kinds of constitution systems (Aufbau § 5 9 ) .
The world of the Aufbau was a world in which values played an indispensable role.
On the other hand, Carnap was deeply impressed by the philosophical current characterized
vaguely as „philosophy of life“ (Lebensphilosophie), in particular by Nietzsche. For
Carnap, Lebensphilosophie was not so much a philosophical doctrine having an argumentative
content, but rather a neo-romantic attitude that took a person’s „life-feeling“ (Lebensge-
fühl )  as the ultimate legitimate guide for what he considered as appropriate for living his
life according to his preferences and inclinations. No philosophical doctrine should rest r ic t
the individual’s autonomy by reglementing his Lebensgefühle. Emphasizing the autonomy of
Leben and its difference to reason led Carnap to a strict "Cartesian" dualism, for which the
practical realm of of life and the theoretical realm of science were neatly separated.  
This attitude based on Lebensgefühle was not easily compatible with Carnap’s scientific and
philosophical interests. This was true all the more, since the Neokantian philosophy aimed at
a global science-oriented Weltanschauung  that comprised all aspects of reality. In the early
and middle twenties Carnap was very impressed by the systematic Neokantian way of
philosophizing that intended to comprehend all aspects of society and culture. The Aufbau may
be conceived as a young philosopher’s ambitious project to provide a philosophical system i n
the spirit of Neokantianism, but avoiding its logical and scientific weaknesses and
limitations. This thorough modernization of the Neokantian program, however, should not
obscure the fact that the systematic spirit of Rickert and Carnap’s endeavors were rather
simi lar.
Seen from the perspective of Lebensphilosophie the Aufbau was overstretching the ken of
reason and rationality. In particular, it threatened the autonomy of Leben as the domain of
values. Indeed, in the Aufbau for every kind of value (ethical, esthetical, economic, and
biological) there was a specific phenomenology (cf. Aufbau  §152). A partisan of the
autonomy of Lebensgefühle would have felt unduly regimented by the resulting ethics,
esthetics, and other normative theories. In any case, about 1929/30 Carnap came to the
conviction that the program of (CSP), as sketched in the Aufbau and still maintained in the
Manifesto, was not feasible. According to the new program of (RSP) philosophy was to be
pursued as the theory of the syntax of scientific language (cf. Carnap 1934,1935). In this
frame there was no room for value statements, psychological, sociological, or historical
considerations about science.
The shift from (CSP) to (RSP) did not mean that the members of the Vienna circle suddenly
lost interest in "value-laden" topics such as bringing about a just socialist society, o r
assessing the on-going developments in politics or art. Quite the contrary, in the early
5thirties Carnap’s political commitment in the Vienna Circle, the Ernst Mach Society, and
similar institutions reached its peak. But his commitment was based on his Lebensgefühl and
not related to scientific philosophy in the sense of (RSP).   With respect to matters of v a -
lues, this separation led to a radical emotivism for which values belonged to the noncognitive
domain of Lebensgefühl. The resulting dualism was to become the main reason for the
controversies between logical empiricists and American pragmatists.
2. The Expulsion of Values from the Constitutional Paradise . The expulsion of values f rom                                                                                                
the realm of respectable philosophical entities began shortly after the Aufbau had been
published in 1928. In the Manifesto (1929) the constitution theory of the Aufbau was s t i l l
considered as the theoretical background of unified science (ibidem, p. 307). Although the
Manifesto considered metaphysics and theology as "debris" (p. 317), nothing was said
against values and value statements. The first attack on values was put forward in a lecture
Carnap delivered in October 1929 at the Bauhaus in Dessau. In this lecture he argued for a
purely instrumental role of science and advocated an irreducible plurality of values. To his
opinion, "valuation (Wertung) is not the cognition of a fact but a personal attitude." (Carnap
1929, RC-110-0749-2). Hence, facts and values had to be neatly separated. The choice of a
value was considered as a matter of one’s personal Lebensgefühl.
The definite dismissal of values as objects of scientific philosophy took place in Overcoming
(1931/32). Usually this paper is considered as a somewhat naive antimetaphysical pam-
phlet best known for the violent attack on Heidegger’s "philososphy of the Nothing".  Actually
Overcoming is also a document in which Carnap reported his private overcoming of
metaphysics, in particular value theory. Thereby an important part of the Aufbau’s consti-
tutional program was abandoned. Overcoming marked the separation of his philosophy f rom
its Neokantian origins and announced the beginning of the genuine logical empiricist period of
his philosophizing. This did not mean, however, that the tension between Leben and Geist
(reason) had disappeared. As will be shown in the next section it was to resurface in his
dispute with American pragmatists on the cognitive status of value judgments. From
Overcoming onwards, for Carnap the world that science dealt with was a world of facts
without values.
The choice of basic values was a matter of "character" (cf. Carnap 1929, and Carnap 1963 ,
1009). This meant, for instance, that there was no moral difference between a "consequent
capitalism" founded on the value of individual enrichment and "socialism" based on the value
of solidarity. The choice of basic values dropped out of the rational discourse. There were no
6reasons for a choosing one basic value or another. It was a matter of taste or "character".             
This entailed that value statements were cognitively meaningless. Values were relegated to
irrational Leben. They became impulses and instincts that might be studied by psychology,
biology or other sciences, but that no longer belonged to the sphere of reasons. The resulting
picture of the world was most clearly presented in his semi-popular lectures Philosophy and
Logical Syntax (1935). Distinguishing between the two basic functions of language, namely,
expression and representation, he proposed the following scheme  (Ibidem, 32):
 Expressive function of Language    Representative Function of Language                                                                                         
ARTS                       SCIENCE (= the system of theoretical knowledge)                                                                              
               Lyrics     <----        Me t aph y s i c s          Physics
         Psychology    ------>   
                    Logic               Biology
              ..........
It never occurred to Carnap that science might involve theoretical and practical knowledge.      
Consequently, his system did not provide a place for practical knowledge.   This scheme of the
relations between philosophy, science, and arts remained essentially intact when Carnap had
immigrated to America. Of course, the conception of philosophy of science as syntax of
scientific language was replaced by one that took into account also semantical and "pragmatic"
aspects of scientific language. But semantics remained as theoretical as syntax, and, as
Morris rightly remarked, Carnap’s "pragmatics of scientific language" was a far cry f rom
pragmatism and remained rather underdeveloped.
Summarizing one may say that already in Europe Carnap had covered a long way towards the
"icy slopes of logic" (Manifesto, 339), which recently were claimed to be characteristic f o r
"logical empiricism in the age of Cold War" (cf. Reisch 2005). From the mid- th i r t ies
onwards Carnap’s logical empiricism was no longer engaged theoretically in practical issues
of society and politics.1 This fact was masked by his ongoing political commitment. This,
however, did not take place in the theoretical framework of (RSP) but was motivated by his
Lebensgefühl  marked by the cultural and political context of "Red Vienna".  
                                    
1
  Uebel’s recently proposed to characterize the theoretical content of the left Vienna circle’s ap-
proach in terms of an „anticorrespondentist anti-metaphysics“ (Uebel 2004, 272).  With Morr is
one may wonder if this stance can be cast in the framework of pure logical analysis of language.
73. Pragmatist Criticisms of logical empiricist Non-cognitivism. By Overcoming Carnap                                                                                                          
might have hoped to have brought to an end the discussion on values among scientific
philosophers once and for all. This, however, was not the case. When he came to the U.S., the
problem of values was to become a major topic in his disputes with his pragmatist allies.
Even worse, the pragmatists did not confine the discussion to the (RSP) version of logical
empiricism but exhumed the value-friendly account of the Aufbau. For instance, already i n
1936 Lewis had spotted the ominous § 152 of the Aufbau in which Carnap had sketched the
constitution of values on the base of  value experiences (cf. Lewis 1936, p. 153). For Lewis,
the analogy there drawn between perceptual experiences and value experiences was
just"obvious". But he confessed that he was unable "to interpret this passage  (§ 152) in a
manner consonant with the general position of the Vienna Circle with respect to the norma-
tive … ." (Ibidem, 152). As it seems, Carnap felt unable too, since he never responded to
Lewis’s remark.
In the early forties Dewey published A Theory of Valuation in the Encyclopedia of Unified
Science edited by Neurath, Carnap, and Morris. For Dewey the meaningfulness of value state-
ments belonged to the essence of pragmatism, and he and the logical empiricists were wel l
aware that their positions were hardly compatible. Nevertheless, apparently for tactical
reasons both groups were ready to cooperate (cf. Reisch 2005). Carnap even swallowed the
following remark in which Dewey came quite close to the bottom of the logical empiricists’s
insistence on a strictly emotivist account of ethics:
"The hard-and-fast line which is supposed by some to exist between "emotive"
and "scientific" language is a reflex of the gap that exists between the intellectual
and the emotional in human relations and activities. … The practical problem that
has to be faced is the establishment of cultural conditions that will support the
kinds of behavior in which emotion and ideas, desires and appraisals, are
integrated (Dewey 1970(1944), 444 - 445).
It is hard to say whether Dewey knew much about the role Leben and Lebensphilosophie had
for Carnap’s fundamental philosophical convictions. In any case he had spotted c lear-s ight-
edly the crucial weakness of Carnap’s position that unduly restricted the domain of rat iona-
lity to the theoretical.
Lewis and Dewey were not the only pragmatists who attacked the logical empiricist non-
cognitivim. In the same vein as Lewis, still in 1963 Morris pointed out that Carnap had en -
dorsed in the Aufbau  a constitution of values quite in line with Lewis’s pragmatist account
(cf. Morris 1963).  Again, Carnap did not respond to Morris’s challenge.
Independently of the constitution theory Morris saw still another possibility for a rapproch-
ement between Carnap’s logical empiricism and pragmatism in which value judgments would
be important, namely, the realm of rules and proposals that had become  central to Carnap’s
8philosophy. This option referred to (CSP) and (RSP) alike. As Morris pointed out, Carnap
often went beyond a mere logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific knowledge, making
proposals of how science, society and life might be organized:                
"In the Logische Aufbau Carnap writes that life has many dimensions other than
science, and the restriction of the term "knowledge" to science is helpful to the fr iendly
relation between the various spheres of life, for the admission of complete
heterogeneity would lessen the strife between them (pp. 257/8) This may or may not
be the case, but the statement is certainly more than a logical analysis of science. I t
contains a recommendation or proposal, made in terms of a theory of the relation of
science to other human activities." (Morris 1963, 97)
Indeed, making "proposals" or "recommendations" was to become one of the most important
characteristics of Carnap’s mature style of philosophizing. Already in the first paper he
published in America, On the Character of Philosophic Problems (Carnap 1934) he was at  
pains to bar possible misunderstandings concerning the (RSP) conception of philosophy of
science as logic or syntax of science, pointing out that a philosophical theorem, formulated as
a proposition of syntax, could be read in two different ways, namely, as an assertion, o r ,
most often more appropriate, as a proposal (cf. Carnap 1934). In the following decades he
emphasised the proposal character of philosophy again and again (cf. Testability and Meaning
(1936/37) and Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology  (1950)). From a pragmatist point of
view "making proposals" is a value-laden activity. Proposals are made for realizing certain
goals that are assessed to be valuable (cf. Lewis 1971). In (Carnap 1950) these pragmatic
questions were characterized as "external questions" and contrasted with "internal
questions" that could be decided by empirical and/or logical methods. Carnap denied that
external questions were a legitimate topic of rational deliberations. Rather, he believed in a
kind of Darwinian conceptual evolution2  in which only the fittest would survive:
"The acceptance or rejection of linguistic forms … will finally be decided by the i r
efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and
complexity of the efforts required. … Let us grant to those who work in any special
field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression …; the work in this
field will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful
function." Carnap (1950, 221)
Evidently, this process of elimination is determined by a complex net of preferences, evalu-
ations and practical assessments. Nevertheless, according to (RSP) this fact was of no
concern to philosophy. Rather, the only task of philosophy, as a theoretical activity, was to
                                    
2
 In other words, Carnap conceived the confrontation between competing linguistic forms as an
example of "the struggle for life". An analogous idea can be found already in the Lebensphilosophie
of Dilthey who applied this Darwinian concept to the struggle of Weltanschauungen: "Those
Weltanschauungen  that lead to useful conceptions of life and foster its understanding, maintain
themselves and supersede the lesser ones" (Dilthey VIII, 85).
9propose frameworks that were to be used, and eventually be approved or rejected by the i r
practionners. From a pragmatist perspective this is but a poor caricature of what is going on
in science. It made sense only for someone like Carnap, who assumed from the outset a s t r ic t
separation between the theoretical and the practical: philosophers on the theoretical side
design linguistic or ontological forms, and scientists, on the practical side test them. This
division of labour is not very convincing.
Let us finally consider Abraham Kaplan’s attempt to make a breach in Carnap’s strict non-
cognitivism. Kaplan, belonging to a younger generation of American pragmatists did not re fer
to Carnap’s "European" Aufbau. Instead, he intended to overcome Carnap’s non-cognitivism
from a purely American perspective. His main objection was that non-cognitivism was based
on an implausible and question-begging fact-value dualism:
"The basic error in the fact-value dualism lies in the supposition that sooner o r
later every value judgment must come to rest upon an absolute end, one which i s
valued unconditionally, without ifs, ands, or buts. Factual considerations relate
only to such conditions, and when these have been let go, we are left afloat in a
sea of subjectivity. That absolute values are groundless does indeed imply that
rationality precludes them; but the conclusion that they underlie all value
judgments, which therefore cannot be objective, only begs the question." (Kaplan
1964, p. 394)
Kaplan’s position directly contradicted Carnap’s Cartesian dualism according to which i n
every value judgment one could neatly distinguish between means and ends such that
eventually a purely optative component could be singled out that had no cognitive meaning
whatsoever. As Carnap put it: "In contrast to Kaplan’s conception, I assert [that] there are
pure optatives. Cognitivism may be defined as the denial of this thesis." (Carnap 1963 ,
1001). According to him, a typical pure optative was a sentence like "Let us take road a
rather than b." Such a sentence, Carnap insisted, had no cognitive meaning since no factual
sentence was logically implied by it.  Hence, according to the logical empiricist meaning
criteria as laid down, for instance, in Overcoming thirty years earlier, a pure optative was
cognitively meaningless.  It should be noted that Carnap’s argumentation was based on a very
strict meaning criterion: only classical deductive logic was could bestow cognitive meaning to
a proposition p, the meaning of p defined as the totality of propositions that can be deduced
from it. Inductive logic or any other kind of logic dealing with only plausible and less than
perfect arguments cannot convey cognitive meaning to a proposition. This not only flew into
the face of any pragmatist account, but also was hardly plausible in the light of Carnap’s
tolerance principle.
1 0
Carnap’s insistence on the existence of pure optatives is explained by the fact that pure
optatives witnessed the autonomy of the domain of Lebensgefühl thereby supporting one of his
basic philosophical tenets.
5. Scientific Philosophy versus Philosophy of Science . The characteristic predicament of                                                                                         
Carnap’s philosophical stance, namely the tension between Lebensphilosophie and science-
oriented Neokantianism never let him seriously consider seriously proposal to strive for a
synthesis of logical empiricism and pragmatism (cf. Morris 1937). After he had given up
(CSP) and subscribed to (RSP) in the early 30s for him the separation between the sphere
of reason and the sphere of life was not negotiable anymore.    
Now European Neokantianism and American pragmatism both were aiming at a
comprehensive philosophical understanding of the world in all its aspects subscribing to an
ample notion of rationality that had a place for facts and values. In contrast, (RSP) opted f o r
a purely formal concept of rationality that excluded values from the sphere of reason.  Thus,
the relation between (RSP) and Neokantianism on the hand, and between (RSP) and
Pragmatism on the other were in some sense analogous. Hence, for Carnap was more at stake
than what met the eyes of American pragmatists. Endorsing the pragmatist position would
have meant for him a kind of return to his Neokantian past that he had overcome more than
thirties years ago. Once again he would have become a follower of a comprehensive system of
scientific philosophy similar in many aspects to (CSP). This he could not do, since it would
have meant "to blur the difference between "attitude and theory" which was "of decisive
importance" for his philosophy in general, as he had already pointed out in Overcoming ( p .
7 9 ) .  
Thus, for Carnap emotivism was not a surface phenomenon. Rather, it was a symptom of a
deeply entrenched Cartesian predicament caused by the tension between Leben and Geist
typical for much of Central European philosophy of the early 20th century. It served as the
signpost for the conviction that philosophy and science were essentially theoretical
endeavors that should be kept separated from the unfathomable feelings and practices of l i fe.
This view was imcompatible with pragmatism. Such a verdict squarely contradicts
Richardson’s recent diagnosis, who proposed to discuss the issues of cognitivism and
emotivism as a merely rhetorical difference between the logical empiricist and the
pragmatist program. More precisely, according to him the rhetoric of logical empiricism
was demarcationist: "the point was to demarcate the proper role of science and to find the
scientifically acceptable replacement for a core of scientific philosophy" … [. On the other
1 1
hand, Dewey’s characteristic rhetoric is said to be "imperialist": the point is to bring scien-
tific rigor into all areas of philosophical concern..."   (Richardson 2002, S45).
In this paper I have argued that the dispute about the cognitive status of value judgments
should be taken as a symptom of a more profound epistemological difference, namely, the d i f -
ference between a Cartesian approach of (RSP) that strictly separated the theoretical and the
practical, and an anti-Cartesian (pragmatist) approach that denied that such a separation
made sense.  External causes  aggravated this dualism but they only brought to the fore what
had been laid down theoretically already around1930 when the Neokantian (CSP) version of
logical empiricism was replaced by the (RSP) version. Thus, although there can be no doubt
that external factors contributed to the evolution of the American brand of logical
empiricism, this development was also marked by internal factors of European provenance
that should not be neglected if one wants to get the picture right.
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